Kantian Journal 41 (1):60-88 (2022)

Are computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways. This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”.
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DOI 10.5922/0207-6918-2022-1-3
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Retrieving Realism.Hubert Dreyfus & Charles Taylor - 2015 - Harvard University Press.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
The Practice of Moral Judgment.Barbara Herman - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (8):414-436.

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