Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435 (2010)
Do we apply higher epistemic standards to subjects with high stakes? This paper argues that we expect different outward behavior from high-stakes subjects—for example, we expect them to collect more evidence than their low-stakes counterparts—but not because of any change in epistemic standards. Rather, we naturally expect subjects in any condition to think in a roughly adaptive manner, balancing the expected costs of additional evidence collection against the expected value of gains in accuracy. The paper reviews a body of empirical work on the automatic regulation of cognitive effort in response to stakes, and argues that we naturally see high- and low-stakes subjects as experiencing different levels of ‘epistemic anxiety’, and anticipate different levels of cognitive effort from them for this reason. If unresolved epistemic anxiety always bars an ascription of knowledge, then we can explain our responses to cases involving shifting stakes without positing any variation in the standards of intuitive knowledge ascription.
|Keywords||knowledge ascription stake-sensitivity epistemic anxiety|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.
Time Constraints and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.Joseph Shin - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):157-180.
The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.
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