Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306 (2010)
Authors
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
Epistemologists generally agree that the stringency of intuitive ascriptions of knowledge is increased when unrealized possibilities ofenor are mentioned. Non-sceptical invanantists (Williamson, Hawthorne) think it a mistake to yield in such cases to the temptation to be more stringent, but they do not deny that we feel it. They contend that the temptation is best explained as the product of a psychological bias known as the availability heuristic. I argue against the availability explanation, and sketch a rival account of what happens to us psychologically when possibilities of error are raised
Keywords availability heuristic  spontaneous discounting  epistemic egocentrism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.624.x
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Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.

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