Knowledge as a Mental State

Authors
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced back to a difference in how each side understands the relationship between the concepts of knowledge and belief, concepts which are understood in both disciplines to be closely linked. Psychologists and philosophers other than Williamson have generally have disagreed about which of the pair is prior and which is derivative. The rival claims of priority are examined both in the light of philosophical arguments by Williamson and others, and in the light of empirical work on mental state attribution
Keywords knowledge  mental state attribution  folk psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
God and Interpersonal Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):421-447.
Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
Factive and Nonfactive Mental State Attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
The Myth of the Hidden.William E. S. McNeill - 2009 - Dissertation, University College London
Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
Epistemic Consciousness.Neil Manson - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.
Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):700-711.
Epistemic Consciousness.C. N. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-09-28

Total downloads
2,331 ( #280 of 2,267,103 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
791 ( #211 of 2,267,103 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature