Authors
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
Williamson has a strikingly economical way of showing how justified true belief can fail to constitute knowledge: he models a class of Gettier cases by means of two simple constraints. His constraints can be shown to rely on some unstated assumptions about the relationship between reality and appearance. These assumptions are epistemologically non-trivial but can be defended as plausible idealizations of our actual predicament, in part because they align well with empirical work on the metacognitive dimension of experience.
Keywords Gettier cases  Epistemic logic  metacognition
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Reprint years 2013
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2013.775014
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References found in this work BETA

The Secret Life of Fluency.Daniel M. Oppenheimer - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (6):237-241.
Luminosity Regained.Selim Berker - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-22.

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Citations of this work BETA

Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.

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