Authors
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
Because knowledge entails true belief, it is can be hard to explain why a given action is naturally seen as driven by one of these states as opposed to the other. A simpler and more radical characterization of knowledge helps to solve this problem while also shedding some light on what is special about social learning.
Keywords knowledge  factivity  belief  mentalizing
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