The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox
In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept of knowledge. However, examining these shifts also raises interesting questions about how we ought to be thinking about possible outcomes in the first place.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Ordinary Meaning and Consilience of Evidence.Justin Sytsma - forthcoming - In Stefan Magen & Karolina Prochownik (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law.
References found in this work
The Enigma of Reason.Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge.Peter Carruthers - 2011 - Oxford University Press.