In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto at Mississauga
Abstract
The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept of knowledge. However, examining these shifts also raises interesting questions about how we ought to be thinking about possible outcomes in the first place.
Keywords lottery paradox  belief  belief attribution
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Enigma of Reason.Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.) - 2017 - Harvard University Press.
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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