Oxford Clarendon Press (1970)

Abstract
Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
Keywords altruism  egoism  practical reason
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Reprint years 2008
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Call number BJ1474.N3
ISBN(s) 0691020027   9780691020020   7532768147
DOI 10.2307/2218611
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Ought, Agents, and Actions.M. Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.
Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.

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