Agency, authorship, and illusion

Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785 (2005)
Abstract
Daniel Wegner argues that conscious will is an illusion. I examine the adequacy of his theory of apparent mental causation and whether, if accurate, it suggests that our experience of agency and authorship should be considered illusory. I examine various interpretations of this claim and raise problems for each interpretation. I also distinguish between the experiences of agency and authorship.
Keywords *Conscious (Personality Factor)  *Volition
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2005.07.002
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References found in this work BETA
The Phenomenology of Free Will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.
The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 323.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
Varieties of Self-Systems Worth Having.Pascal Boyer, Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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