In M. Marraffa, M. Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer (2007)

Authors
Eddy Nahmias
Georgia State University
Abstract
This chapter discusses how research in situationist social psychology may pose largely undiscussed threats to autonomous agency, free will, and moral responsibility.
Keywords situationism  moral responsibility  free will
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The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
Skepticism About Persons.John M. Doris - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
Situationism, Going Mental, and Modal Akrasia.Dylan Murray - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):711-736.
Performance, Self-Explanation, and Agency.Ron Mallon - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2777-2798.

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