Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242 (2007)
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Abstract

In this paper we discuss studies that show that most people do not find determinism to be incompatible with free will and moral responsibility if determinism is described in a way that does not suggest mechanistic reductionism. However, if determinism is described in a way that suggests reductionism, that leads people to interpret it as threatening to free will and responsibility. We discuss the implications of these results for the philosophical debates about free will, moral responsibility, and determinism.

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Author Profiles

D. Justin Coates
University of Houston
Eddy Nahmias
Georgia State University