Mind 123 (491):753-790 (2014)
AbstractSince at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons explain obligations and show that it solves this problem
Similar books and articles
Two Approaches to the Formalisation of Defeasible Deontic Reasoning.Henry Prakken - 1996 - Studia Logica 57 (1):73 - 90.
A Paraconsistentist Approach to Chisholm's Paradox.Marcelo Esteban Coniglio & Newton Marques Peron - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (3):299-326.
Moral Dilemmas, Disjunctive Obligations, and Kant's Principle That 'Ought' Implies 'Can'.Dale Jacquette - 1991 - Synthese 88 (1):43 - 55.
Adaptive Domains of Deontic Reasoning.Laurence Fiddick - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):105 – 116.
Reasoning About Actions and Obligations in First-Order Logic.Gert -Jan C. Lokhorst - 1996 - Studia Logica 57 (1):221 - 237.
Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
Deontic Logic and Natural Language.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Dov Gabbay, Ron van der Meyden, John Horty, Xavier Parent & Leandert van der Torre (eds.), The Handbook of Deontic Logic (Vol. II). College Publications.
From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia.Dominik Klein & Alessandra Marra - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (1):85-128.