The Logic of Reasons

In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press. pp. 67-84 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this chapter, we begin by sketching in the broadest possible strokes the ideas behind two formal systems that have been introduced with to goal of explicating the ways in which reasons interact to support the actions and conclusions they do. The first of these is the theory of defeasible reasoning developed in the seminal work of Pollock; the second is a more recent theory due to Horty, which adapts and develops the default logic introduced by Reiter to provide an account of reasons. However, the implementations are complex enough, in both cases, to prevent anything more than this sketch. And we would not want to give the impression that we think that work on the logic of reasons must follow the path mapped out in either of these theories—indeed, we feel that the field is wide open. In the remainder of the chapter, therefore, will concentrate on a number of issues bearing on the logic of reasons that are either not treated in the work of Pollock and Horty, or whose treatment there is, we feel, either inadequate or incomplete. These are: first, the question of whether it is necessary to understand logical interactions among reasons themselves, rather than simply between reasons and the actions or conclusions they support, and if so, what principles might govern these interactions; second, priority relations among reasons and the notion of reason accrual; and third, some problems posed by undercutting defeat.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.
Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
Aristotle, Menaechmus, and Circular Proof.Jonathan Barnes - 1976 - Classical Quarterly 26 (02):278-.
Reasons as Defaults.John Horty - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28.
Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):353-360.
Reasons for action: Justification vs. explanation.James Lenman - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Are there any nonmotivating reasons for action?Noa Latham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 273.
How many kinds of reasons?Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.
Teleological Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Argumentation and the Force of Reasons.Robert C. Pinto - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (3):268-295.
Reasons, knowledge, and probability.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
Friendship and reasons of intimacy.Diane Jeske - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):329-346.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-06

Downloads
312 (#58,525)

6 months
81 (#47,411)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Shyam Nair
Arizona State University
John Horty
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.
Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements.Robert Mullins - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:568-599.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.

View all 25 references / Add more references