Family pyramidal holdings and board of directors

International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 3 (4):394-406 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper we relate the board's attributes to the firm's opacity as measured by the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. We find that larger boards and outside directors are associated with reduced opacity, especially in freestanding firms. However, directors' excess control is associated with a significant increase in firm's opacity. We also find that the presence of family pyramidal holding defuses any potential monitoring benefits of board attributes. Our findings suggest that the firm's ultimate ownership structure is not neutral in determining the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors. This might help explain existing mixed evidence on the monitoring role of the board of directors.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,712

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

22 (#527,746)

6 months
4 (#198,787)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references