Objective Belief Functions as Induced Measures

Theory and Decision 55 (1):71-83 (2003)
Given a belief function ? on the set of all subsets of prizes, how should ? values be understood as a decision alternative? This paper presents and characterizes an induced-measure interpretation of belief functions
Keywords Economics / Management Science   Economics/Management Science, general   Operation Research/Decision Theory   Methodology of the Social Sciences
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DOI 10.1023/B:THEO.0000019053.53742.37
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