The First Half of the Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B)

Ideas Y Valores 57 (137):93-112 (2008)
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After the publication of Strawson’s “The Bounds of Sense”, the Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has been widely regarded as a proof of the objectivity of knowledge as a condition of unity of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, many interpreters accept that there are passages which cannot be easily integrated into such a strategy. In this article, through an analysis of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction, I try to point out the need to adopt a different interpretation according to which Kant does not consider objectivity as a condition of self-consciousness, but rather self-consciousness as a necessary condition of objectivity.



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