Action-oriented Perception

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446 (2012)
Abstract
Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q-able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q-able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually
Keywords Perception  Higher order properties  Properties represented in perception  Action-properties  Action-oriented representation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00407.x
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Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.

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Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
The Role of Imagination in Decision-Making.Bence Nanay - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):126-142.

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