Blur and perceptual content

Analysis 78 (2):254-260 (2018)

Authors
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Abstract
Intentionalism about visual experiences is the view according to which the phenomenal character of a visual experience supervenes on the content of this experience. One of the most influential objections to this view is about blur: seeing a fuzzy contour clearly and seeing a sharp contour blurrily have different phenomenal character but the same content. I argue that this objection does not work if we understand perceptual content simply, and not particularly controversially, as partly constituted by the sum total of perceptually attributed properties, some determinable, some determinate.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx119
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References found in this work BETA

Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experiences. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.
Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.

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Citations of this work BETA

Science, Substance and Spatial Appearances.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.

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