Hallucination as Mental Imagery

Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (7-8):65-81 (2016)

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is treated marks an important stance in one of the most hotly contested debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between 'relationalists' and 'representationalists'. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental imagery, then we have a very straightforward way of arguing against disjunctivism: if hallucination is a form of mental imagery and if mental imagery and perception have some substantive common denominator, then a fortiori, perception and hallucination will also have a substantive common denominator.
Keywords Hallucination  Mental imagery  Disjunctivism  Dependency Thesis  Representationalism  Relationalism
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Mental Imagery and Fiction.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):731-754.
The Two Faces of Mental Imagery.Margherita Arcangeli - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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