Morality or modality?: What does the attribution of intentionality depend on?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 25-39 (2010)
Abstract
It has been argued that the attribution of intentional actions is sensitive to our moral judgment. I suggest an alternative, where the attribution of intentional actions depends on modal (and not moral) considerations. We judge a foreseen side-effect of an agent’s intentionally performed action to be intentional if the following modal claim is true: if she had not ignored considerations about the foreseen side-effect, her action might have been different (other things being equal). I go through the most important examples of the asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality and point out that the modal account can cover all the problematic cases, whereas the moral account can’t
Keywords Intentional action  Experimental philosophy  Modal properties
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0087
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References found in this work BETA
Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.

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Act Individuation: An Experimental Approach.Joseph Ulatowski - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):249-262.

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