Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254 (2010)

Authors
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Abstract
When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”.
Keywords Amodal perception  Mental imagery  Perceptual presence
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9407-5
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Image and Mind.Stephen Michael Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Two Faces of Mental Imagery.Margherita Arcangeli - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):304-322.
Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
Imaginative Attitudes.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):664-686.
Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.

View all 76 citations / Add more citations

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