The Monist 100 (4):485-500 (2017)

Authors
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Abstract
One of the most promising trends both in the neuroscience of pain and in psychiatric treatments of chronic pain is the focus on mental imagery. My aim is to argue that if we take these findings seriously, we can draw very important and radical philosophical conclusions. I argue that what we pretheoretically take to be pain is partly constituted by sensory stimulation-driven pain processing and partly constituted by mental imagery. This general picture can explain some problematic cases of pain perception, for example, phantom-limb pain, and it also has important consequences for some recent philosophical debates about the nature and content of pain.
Keywords Pain  Mental imagery  Phantom pain
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DOI 10.1093/monist/onx024
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Mimesis as Make-Believe.Kendall L. Walton - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):413-434.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.

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Citations of this work BETA

Implicit Bias as Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):329-347.
Mental imagery: pulling the plug on perceptualism.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3847-3868.
Mental Imagery.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Amodal Completion and Relationalism.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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