Authors
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Abstract
I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures: the “visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation.” I argue for the following four claims: (a) the depicted scene is represented by ventral perception, (b) the depicted scene is not represented by dorsal perception, (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception, and (d) the picture surface is not necessarily represented by ventral perception
Keywords Picture perception  Depiction  Twofoldness  Dorsal vision  Ventral vision  Pictures of pictures
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9219-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

View all 67 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Visual Feeling of Presence.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):112-136.
The Neural Dynamics of Seeing-In.Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1285-1324.
Threefoldness.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):163-182.
Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):372-393.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

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