Perceiving tropes

Erkenntnis 77 (1):1-14 (2012)
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Abstract

There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to the first one, perception is representational: it represents the world as being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and a token object. These two views are thought to be incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of the representational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in favor of the relational view. According to this version of representationalism, the properties represented in perception are tropes—abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I call this view ‘trope representationalism’

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Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

References found in this work

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.

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