The Representationalism versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism about Perception

European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):321-336 (2015)
Authors
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Abstract
There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to representationalism, perceptual states are representations: they represent the world as being a certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically, sometimes not. According to relationalism, perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived objects are literally constituents of our perceptual states and not of the contents thereof. Perceptual states are not representations. My aim is to argue that if we frame this debate as a debate about the individuation of perceptual states, rather than the nature of perception, then we can reconcile these two seemingly conflicting ways of thinking about perception
Keywords Representationalism  Relationalism  Perception  Representation  Contextualism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/ejop.12085
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,086
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 58 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Unconscious Perception Reconsidered.Ian Phillips - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):471-514.
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
Contextualism About Object-Seeing.Ben Phillips - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2377-2396.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-01-30

Total views
211 ( #27,035 of 2,313,336 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #42,106 of 2,313,336 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature