The weights of evidence

Episteme 5 (3):pp. 267-281 (2008)

Interest in the Keynesian concept of evidential weight has led to divergent views concerning the burden of proof in adjudication. It is argued that Keynes's concept is properly engaged only in the context of one special kind of decision, the decision whether or not the evidence is ripe for a decision on the underlying merits, whether the latter decision is based on probability, relative plausibility, coherence or otherwise. As a general matter, this question of ripeness is appropriately assigned to the judiciary for resolution as part of the burden of production, rather than to the jury or other factfinder as part of the burden of persuasion
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3366/E1742360008000385
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,206
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
37 ( #244,039 of 2,285,634 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #575,397 of 2,285,634 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature