What if reality has no architecture?

The Monist 94 (2):181-197 (2011)
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The aim of this paper is to show that we can deny that reality is neatly segmented into natural kinds and still give a plausible view about what science is supposed to do – and the way science in fact works does not rely on the dubious metaphysical assumption that reality is segmented into natural kinds. The score is simple: either there are natural kinds or there aren’t. The former view has been the default position in mainstream analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science. I want to put the latter on the table as a metaphysically and scientifically plausible alternative.

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Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

Citations of this work

Singularist Semirealism.Bence Nanay - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):371-394.
The Realism of Taxonomic Pluralism.Ka Ho Lam - 2020 - Metaphysics 3 (1):1-16.

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References found in this work

Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory.Timothy D. Lyons - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):891-901.

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