Noumenal Ignorance: Why, For Kant, Can't We Know Things in Themselves?

In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Companion to Kant. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 91-116 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper we look at a few of the most prominent ways of articulating Kant’s critical argument for Noumenal Ignorance — i.e., the claim that we cannot cognize or have knowledge of any substantive, synthetic truths about things-in-themselves — and then provide two different accounts of our own.

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Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval
Princeton University
Andrew Chignell
Princeton University

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