Contingency, Necessity, and Causation in Kierkegaard's Theory of Change

Abstract

In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain of his claims about causation. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy

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2011-06-13

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Shannon Nason
Purdue University (PhD)

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