The case for intrinsic theory: XIII. The role of the qualitative in a modal account of inner awareness
Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):319-350 (2006)
Theorists of consciousness differ in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a qualitative character, and in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a reflexive character. This article mainly discusses one such theory, wherein it is proposed that both the qualitative character and the reflexive character are intrinsic to each state of consciousness that possesses them and are modal characters of each state of consciousness that possesses them. What is centrally of concern here is that special part of the theory in question that treats of the reflexive character of our states of consciousness and, more specifically, the role that is assigned therein to their qualitative character
|Keywords||Awareness* Consciousness States* Metacognition* Emotions Psychological Theories Theories|
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