Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373-400 (1994)
In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is related to the referents of the concept of consciousness4. I then address the latter concept more directly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fourm entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competing accounts of consciousness4 that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of William Hamilton and the inner-eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds of account are very much with us today
|Keywords||Consciousness Intrinsic Mental Metaphysics Social Philosophy Locke|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Concept of Consciousness4 the Reflective Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373–400.
The Concept of Consciousness5: The Unitive Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):401–424.
The Concept of Consciousness: The Unitive Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):401-24.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
The Concept of Consciousness: The General State Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1999 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):59-87.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory V: Some Arguments From James's Varieties.Thomas Natsoulas - 2001 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67.
Consciousness and Self-Awareness: Part II: Consciousness4, Consciousness5, and Consciousness6.Thomas Natsoulas - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):75-94.
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Modern Self.Klaus Brinkmann - 2005 - History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):27-48.
What is This Autonoetic Consciousness?Thomas Natsoulas - 2003 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):229-254.
Consciousness: Varieties of Intrinsic Theory.Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (2):107-32.
The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's Essay.Shelley Weinberg - 2008 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1):21-40.
Consciousness and Gibson's Concept of Awareness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 3 (3):305-28.
Concepts or Metacognition - What is the Issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness”.Kristina Musholt - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):721-722.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory IV: An Argument From How Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem.Thomas Natsoulas - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.
The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #595,800 of 2,164,576 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #347,948 of 2,164,576 )
How can I increase my downloads?