The problem of Identity in the Identity Theory of Mind

Pratidhwani the Echo (I):115-121 (2012)
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Abstract

The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. The main thesis of this theory is – states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. This theory leaves many things unexplained with regard to the relation between mind and body, which have been questioned by different thinkers in different periods. Hence, in this article I am going to find out only the problem of identity in the ‘Identity theory of mind’.

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References found in this work

Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Minds. New York, USA: New York University Press. pp. 138-164.
The 'mental' and the 'physical'.Herbert Feigl - 1958 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497.
Materialism as a scientific hypothesis.Ullin T. Place - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (January):101-4.
Low claim assertions.Ullin T. Place - 1989 - In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 121--135.

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