Pratidhwani the Echo (I):115-121 (2012)
AbstractThe identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. The main thesis of this theory is – states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. This theory leaves many things unexplained with regard to the relation between mind and body, which have been questioned by different thinkers in different periods. Hence, in this article I am going to find out only the problem of identity in the ‘Identity theory of mind’.
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