Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):679-696 (2011)

Authors
Rekha Nath
University of Alabama
Abstract
Virginia Held argues that terrorism can be justified in some instances. But unlike standard, consequentialist justifications, hers is deontological. This paper critically examines her argument. It explores how the values of fairness, responsibility, and desert can serve to justify acts of terrorism. In doing so, two interpretations of her account are considered: a responsibility-insensitive and a responsibility-sensitive interpretation. On the first, her argument collapses into a consequentialist justification. On the second, it relies on an implausible conception of responsibility. Either way, her argument fails as a distinctly deontological defense of terrorism
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Social and Political Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0037-802X
DOI 10.5840/soctheorpract201137438
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References found in this work BETA

Oppression.Marilyn Frye - 2000 - In Lorraine Code (ed.), Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories. London & New York: Routledge. pp. 370.
On Terrorism.R. M. Hare - 1979 - Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (4):241-249.
Defining Terrorism.C. A. J. Coady - 2004 - In Igor Primoratz (ed.), Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 3--14.
How Can Terrorism Be Justified?Uwe Steinhoff - 2004 - In Igor Primoratz (ed.), Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 97--109.

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