Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):603-616 (2014)

Two different types of functional dependencies are compared: dependencies that are functional due to the laws of nature and dependencies that are functional if all involved agents behave rationally. The first type of dependencies was axiomatized by Armstrong. This article gives a formal definition of the second type of functional dependencies in terms of strategic games and describes a sound and complete axiomatization of their properties. The axiomatization is significantly different from the Armstrong’s axioms
Keywords Axiomatization  Rationality  Completeness  Dependency
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-013-9283-5
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Marketing Impact on Diffusion in Social Networks.Pavel Naumov & Jia Tao - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 20:49-74.
Functional Dependence in Strategic Games.Kristine Harjes & Pavel Naumov - 2016 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (3):341-353.
Symmetry in Information Flow.Jeffrey Kane & Pavel Naumov - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):253-265.

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