Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment

Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174 (1996)
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Abstract

In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
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The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1991 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

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