Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment

Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174 (1996)

Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413766
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.

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Citations of this work BETA

AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
Ranking Functions, AGM Style.Wolfgang Spohn - 1999 - Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors.

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