Foundational belief change

Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533 (1994)
This paper is concerned with the construction of a base contraction (revision) operation such that the theory contraction (revision) operation generated by it will be fully AGM-rational. It is shown that the theory contraction operation generated by Fuhrmann's minimal base contraction operation, even under quite strong restrictions, fails to satisfy the "supplementary postulates" of belief contraction. Finally Fuhrmann's construction is appropriately modified so as to yield the desired properties. The new construction may be described as involving a modification of safe (base) contraction so as to make it maxichoice
Keywords belief  change  contraction  revision  base  theory
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DOI 10.1007/BF01049408
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References found in this work BETA
André Fuhrmann (1991). Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Ove Hansson (1993). Reversing the Levi Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
Sven Ove Hansson (1993). Changes of Disjunctively Closed Bases. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 2 (4):255-284.
Stephen Murray Glaister (2000). Recovery Recovered. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):171 - 206.

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