Analysis 33 (5):160-167 (1973)
One difference between traditional and contemporary nontraditional theories of memory is that the former would affirm, whereas the latter would deny, that a person can be correctly described as having remembered that p solely in virtue of having knowledge the certainty of which is grounded upon the person’s present remembering. I argue that there cannot be such a case, and that what may appear to be such a case—as presented in Don Locke’s book Memory—can be explicated by a contemporary nontraditional theorist without making any concessions to the traditional theorist
|Keywords||Memory Personal memory Justification Preservationism Basing|
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