On the Evidence of One's "Memories"

Analysis 33 (5):160-167 (1973)
One difference between traditional and contemporary nontraditional theories of memory is that the former would affirm, whereas the latter would deny, that a person can be correctly described as having remembered that p solely in virtue of having knowledge the certainty of which is grounded upon the person’s present remembering. I argue that there cannot be such a case, and that what may appear to be such a case—as presented in Don Locke’s book Memory—can be explicated by a contemporary nontraditional theorist without making any concessions to the traditional theorist
Keywords Memory  Personal memory  Justification  Preservationism  Basing
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/33.5.160
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,411
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Naylor (2015). Justification and Forgetting. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):372-391.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

122 ( #36,426 of 1,924,713 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #211,819 of 1,924,713 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.