Jake Nebel
University of Southern California
Derek Parfit argues that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. I present a counterexample: a world in which no one's moral beliefs have any motivating force. I explain how Parfit's metaethical commitments imply that such a world is possible, and why this possibility is a problem for Parfit's project of reconciling Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism. I consider two of Parfit's responses to my counterexample.
Keywords Parfit  rule consequentialism  consequentialism
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v6i2.149
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References found in this work BETA

The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
The Externalist and the Amoralist.James Lenman - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):441-457.
The Challenge of Communal Internalism.Jon Tresan - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):179-199.
Internalists Beware—We Might All Be Amoralists!Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):1 - 14.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rule-Consequentialism.Brad Hooker - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):67-77.
Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination.Marius Baumann - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (3).

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