Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2779-2787 (2020)

Authors
Jake Nebel
University of Southern California
Abstract
According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population contexts.
Keywords person-affecting restriction  incommensurability  anonymity  population ethics  welfarism  nonidentity problem
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01338-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?Gustaf Arrhenius - 2009 - In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. pp. 289--314.
The Value of Existence.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 424-444.
Prioritarianism and Population Ethics.Nils Holtug - 2012 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 25 (1):45-56.
Contractualism, Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-Identity Problem.Corey Katz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):103-119.
Non-Identity for Non-Humans.Duncan Purves & Benjamin Hale - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1165-1185.
Ethical Theory and Population Problems.Kevin Espen Moon - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Population Axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-08-20

Total views
833 ( #6,294 of 2,433,134 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
156 ( #3,731 of 2,433,134 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes