Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105 (2019)

Authors
Jake Nebel
University of Southern California
Abstract
The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as they are in the case of "believes." In many cases, however, intersubstitution of that-clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are systematically ambiguous. I reject both these views. On my view, the that-clause complements of propositional attitude verbs denote propositions, but proposition descriptions do not.
Keywords propositions  that-clauses  substitution failures  propositional attitude reports
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-7213014
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Objects of Thought.A. N. PRIOR - 1971 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.
"That"-Clauses and Propositional Anaphors.Peter van Elswyk - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2861-2875.

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