Synthese 89 (1):89 - 109 (1991)
Nancy Cartwright has drawn attention to how explanations are actually given in mathematical sciences. She argues that these procedures support an antirealist thesis that fundamental explanatory laws are not true. Moreover, she claims to be be essentially following Duhem's line of thought in developing this thesis. Without wishing to detract from the importance of her observations, it is suggested that they do not necessarily require the antirealist thesis. The antirealist interpretation of Duhem is also disputed. It is argued that Duhemian points, often understood antirealistically, bear a realist construal, and that antirealist interpretations of Duhem typically run into problems of consistency or of reducing his position to absurdity.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1954 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Rehabilitating Theory: Refusal of the 'Bottom-Up' Construction of Scientific Phenomena.Samuel Schindler - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):160-184.
Epistemology of a Believing Historian: Making Sense of Duhem's Anti-Atomism.Klodian Coko - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 50:71-82.
Pierre Duhem and the Inconsistency Between Instrumentalism and Natural Classification.Sonia Maria Dion - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):12-19.
Similar books and articles
Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem.Karen Merikangas Darling - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Cartwright on Laws and Composition.David Spurrett - 2001 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (3):253 – 268.
Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
Holism a Century Ago: The Elaboration of Duhem's Thesis.Anastasios A. Brenner - 1990 - Synthese 83 (3):325 - 335.
Simple Theories of a Messy World: Truth and Explanatory Power in Nonlinear Dynamics.Alexander Rueger & W. David Sharp - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):93-112.
The Fundamental Laws of Physics Can Tell the Truth.Renat Nugayev - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):79 – 87.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads180 ( #24,802 of 2,164,866 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,443 of 2,164,866 )
How can I increase my downloads?