Cognition 164:206-211 (2017)

Authors
Neil Van Leeuwen
Georgia State University
Abstract
In an earlier issue, I argue (2014) that psychology and epistemology should distinguish religious credence from factual belief. These are distinct cognitive attitudes. Levy (2017) rejects this distinction, arguing that both religious and factual “beliefs” are subject to “shifting” on the basis of fluency and “intuitiveness.” Levy’s theory, however, (1) is out of keeping with much research in cognitive science of religion and (2) misrepresents the notion of factual belief employed in my theory. So his claims don’t undermine my distinction. I conclude by suggesting some approaches to empirically testing our views.
Keywords belief  religion  science  imagination  make-believe  compartmentalization  credence  religious credence  factual belief  fluency
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.021
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The Factual Belief Fallacy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism (eds. T. Coleman & J. Jong):319-343.

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