When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,150

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

When does falsehood preclude knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.
Knowledge despite falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
Knowledge with and Without Belief.Michael Veber - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.
True and False: An Exchange.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - In André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.), Circularity, Definition, and Truth. Indian Council of Philosophical Research. pp. 365-370.
Knowledge and the internal revisited.John Mcdowell - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):97-105.
Knowledge without Truth.Priyedarshi Jetli - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:97-103.
The love of truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-02

Downloads
17 (#871,438)

6 months
2 (#1,203,746)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.
Knowledge despite falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references