A defense of contingent logical truths

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):153-162 (2012)
Abstract
A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model M but, for some model M , false at some world of M . We argue that there are such truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s definition of truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with an actuality operator. We argue that this extension is the philosophically proper account of validity. We counter recent arguments to the contrary presented in Hanson’s ‘Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth’ (Philos Stud 130:437–459, 2006 )
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9624-y
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References found in this work BETA
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Two Notions of Necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
6. Demonstratives.David Kaplani - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 83.

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Counterfactual Theories of Knowledge and the Notion of Actuality.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673.

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