Philosophical Studies 142 (2):277-292 (2008)
Karen Bennett has recently argued that the views articulated by Linsky and Zalta (Philos Perspect 8:431–458, 1994) and (Philos Stud 84:283–294, 1996) and Plantinga (The nature of necessity, 1974) are not consistent with the thesis of actualism, according to which everything is actual. We present and critique her arguments. We first investigate the conceptual framework she develops to interpret the target theories. As part of this effort, we question her definition of ‘proxy actualism’. We then discuss her main arguments that the theories carry a commitment to actual entities that do not exist. We end by considering and addressing a worry that might have been the driving force behind Bennett’s claim that Linsky and Zalta’s view is not fully actualistic.
|Keywords||Actualism Bennett Linsky and Zalta Modality Necessary existence Plantinga Simplest QML|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics.Edward N. Zalta - 1983 - D. Reidel.
In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic.Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):431-458.
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Neo-Meinongian neo-Russellians.Seyed N. Mousavian - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):229-259.
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