Bennett and “proxy actualism”

Philosophical Studies 142 (2):277-292 (2009)
Karen Bennett has recently argued that the views articulated by Linsky and Zalta (Philos Perspect 8:431–458, 1994) and (Philos Stud 84:283–294, 1996) and Plantinga (The nature of necessity, 1974) are not consistent with the thesis of actualism, according to which everything is actual. We present and critique her arguments. We first investigate the conceptual framework she develops to interpret the target theories. As part of this effort, we question her definition of ‘proxy actualism’. We then discuss her main arguments that the theories carry a commitment to actual entities that do not exist. We end by considering and addressing a worry that might have been the driving force behind Bennett’s claim that Linsky and Zalta’s view is not fully actualistic.
Keywords Actualism  Bennett  Linsky and Zalta  Modality  Necessary existence  Plantinga  Simplest QML
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (1998). Bare Possibilia. Erkenntnis 48 (2/3):257--73.

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Seyed N. Mousavian (2010). Neo-Meinongian neo-Russellians. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):229-259.

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