IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):203-235 (2020)
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Abstract

On the one hand, there seem to be compelling parallels to moral responsibility, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness in domains other than the moral. For example, we often praise people for their aesthetic and epistemic achievements and blame them for their failures. On the other hand, it has been argued that there is something special about the moral domain, so that at least one robust kind of responsibility can only be found there. In this paper, I argue that we can adopt a unifying framework for locating responsible agency across domains, thereby capturing and explaining more of our actual practices. The key, I argue, is to identify the right conditions for being morally accountable, which I take to be a matter of having an opportunity of a good enough quality to act well. With this account in hand, I argue that we can adopt a unifying framework that allows us to recognize parallels across domains, even as it points the way to important differences among them.

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Dana Kay Nelkin
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Aesthetic obligations.Robbie Kubala - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (12):e12712.
The Musicality of Speech.James H. P. Lewis - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
Aesthetic Blame.Robbie Kubala - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Responsibility From the Margins.David Shoemaker - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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