Philosophical Studies:1-19 (forthcoming)

Authors
Dana Kay Nelkin
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
This paper focuses on the role of culpability in determining the degree of liability to defensive harm, and asks whether there are any restrictions on when culpability is relevant to liability. A natural first suggestion is that it is only relevant when combined with an actual threat of harm in the situation in which defensive harm becomes salient as a means of protection. The paper begins by considering the question of whether two people are equally liable to defensive harm in a situation if both culpably intend to harm another, but due to circumstances outside the control of the two people only one has a chance of succeeding in causing harm. I argue that there is no difference in liability between the two. I then turn to a kind of slippery slope challenge that accepting this conclusion would lead to a vast over-inclusiveness in those liable to defensive harm, and consider a recent attempt at meeting it that requires that a person’s culpability can only affect liability if it concerns the very situation in which defensive harm is relevant. Finally, I put forward and assess a new way of meeting the challenge that appeals to a particular conception of culpability together with auxiliary theses concerning how culpability can decrease over time, among others.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-021-01612-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,388
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.
Defensive Killing.Helen Frowe - 2014 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Active and Passive Euthanasia.James Rachels - 1975 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Self-Defense.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1991 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (4):283-310.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Defensive Liability Without Culpability.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2016 - In Christian Coons & Michael Weber (eds.), The Ethics of Self- Defense. Oxford University Press.
Two grounds of liability.Victor Tadros - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
Moral Luck and Liability Lotteries.Guy Sela - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (3):317-331.
The Limits of Criminal Culpability.Mark Thornton - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25 (1):159-175.
Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm.Jonathan Quong - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):815-829.
Criminal Liability in a Medical Context: The Treatment of Good Intentions.Andrew Ashworth - 1996 - In A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability. Oxford University Press. pp. 173--93.
The Nature and Significance of Culpability.David O. Brink - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):347-373.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-02-19

Total views
18 ( #584,250 of 2,445,517 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #76,302 of 2,445,517 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes