Ratio 12 (1):54–79 (1999)

Mark T. Nelson
Westmont College
I characterise moral intuitionism as the methodological claim that one may legitimately appeal to moral judgments in the course of moral reasoning even when those judgments are not supported by inference from other judgments. I describe two patterns of criticism of this method: ‘morally unserious’ criticisms, which hold that ‘morality is bunk’, so appeals to moral intuitions are bunk as well; and ‘morally serious’ criticisms, which hold that morality is not bunk, but that appeals to moral intuition are nonetheless misguided. I consider morally serious criticisms of Kantian and Aristotelian provenance, but defend the intuitionist method from both.
Keywords moral intuitionism  moral epistemology  Kant  Aristotle
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00077
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An Argument for the Use of Aristotelian Method in Bioethics.Peter Allmark - 2005 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 9 (1):69-79.

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