Puzzling pairs

Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):109 - 119 (2002)
Abstract
Propositional attitude ascribing sentences seem to give rise to failures of substitution. Is this phenomena best accounted for semantically, by constructing a semantics for propositional attitude ascribing sentences that invalidates the Substitution Principle, or pragmatically? In this paper I argue against semantic accounts of such phenomena. I argue that any semantic theory that respects all our apparent substitution failure intuitions will entail that the noun-phrase position outside the scope of the attitude verb is not open to substitution salva veritate, which is counter-intuitive.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1015716332044
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,838
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
Agreement and Communication.Max Kölbel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):101-120.
Specifying Desires.Delia Graff Fara - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):250-272.
Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
48 ( #123,230 of 2,231,689 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #446,071 of 2,231,689 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature