Sinnott–Armstrong's moral scepticism

Ratio 16 (1):63–82 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's recent defense of moral skepticism raises the debate to a new level, but I argue that it is unsatisfactory because of problems with its assumption of global skepticism, with its use of the Skeptical Hypothesis Argument, and with its use of the idea of contrast classes and the correlative distinction between "everyday" justification and "philosophical" justification. I draw on Chisholm's treatment of the Problem of the Criterion to show that my claim that I know that, e.g., baby-torture is wrong, is no more question-begging than Sinnott-Armstrong's denial that I know this.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,446

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

68 (#214,120)

6 months
5 (#239,721)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark T. Nelson
Westmont College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references